The Common European Sales Law proposal - European Private Law at the crossroads? by Heidemann, Maren
This article discusses arguments in favour and againstthe legal basis of the Proposal for a Regulation of theEuropean Parliament (EP) and the Council on a
Common European Sales Law (CESL), published as COM
(2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011. It considers the
international private law as well as some individual
substantive rules of both the Regulation and the actual sales
law. Suggestions are made how to adjust and complement this
instrument in order to achieve what the EU legislator is
setting out to do, and indeed what the legal and trading
community, including consumers, need.
Central problems with the proposal are found to be
the intended exclusive role of CESL in relation to existing
transnational rules of international commercial contracts
and the weakly identified reasons for there being separate
regimes for consumers and merchants in the first place.
Both consumer and commercial contracts have specific
characteristics and requirements which need legislative
attention within the EU and beyond but which have not
yet been carved out sufficiently by legal doctrine.
Further research is therefore needed into the contents of
typical consumer and merchant contracts, both formal
and substantive. A consolidated and possibly separate and
mandatory consumer law for the Common Market could
then be tailored in a more integrated and convincing way.
1. UNIQUE AND UNPRECEDENTED NEW
LEGISLATION
Looking at all the law that the European Union has passed
which impacts on private law one can say that this is the first
piece of substantive contract law, especially when using
continental terminology. Generally, Directives and Regulations
have to be regarded as public law. They are secondary laws passed
by a legislative body on a supranational level, often addressed to
other public bodies for implementation. Procedural law (in the
case of, say, the Brussels I Regulation – Council Regulation
(EC) No 44/2001) is also regarded as public law.
The outward appearance of this new legal instrument
also provides a novelty among the range of EU legislative
acts. The proposal comprises the following components:
• The Explanatory Memorandum consisting of five
sections entitled Context of the proposal – Results of
Consultations with the interested parties and impact
assessments; Legal Elements of the Proposal; Budgetary
implication; Additional Information.The Regulation (the so
called chapeau) – 16 articles, preceded by 37 recitals of
a preamble.
• Annex I (the Common European Sales Law itself) – 8
‘Parts’ divided into 18 Chapters covering 186 Articles
altogether.
• Appendices (withdrawal notice and form).
• Annex II – Standard Information Notice.
2. LEGAL BASIS
The creators emphasise in the Explanatory
Memorandum that the proposal is based on Article 114
TFEU. There had been much debate whether it ought to
have been based on Art. 352 TFEU (see p 8, bottom line
of the proposal (s 3 of the Explanatory memorandum)).
This would have required Parliamentary or even
nationwide procedure in many Member States.
Four opposing reasoned opinions under Article 6 of
Protocol 2 to the TFEU (the “Lisbon Treaty”) were received
within the two month deadline (12 December 2011) by the
Parliaments of Austria, Belgium, Germany and the UK, all
complaining about breach of the subsidiarity principle (as
that is the only ground for those opposing votes to be based
on). The necessary number of votes to stop the process was
not received, and therefore the chances of this proposal
being rejected are very small given that the European
Parliament (EP) already committed itself to supporting the
proposal in June 2011 (see press release by the European
Commission about the vote of 8 June 2011: “European
Commission welcomes Parliament’s support for an optional
Europe-wide contract law”, accessible at
ht tp : / /europa .eu/rap id/pressRe leasesAct ion .do?
reference=IP/11/683&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en [3 April 2012]. The EP thereby
accepted the equally unprecedented situation that a
proposal was voted for and consulted about without the
actual text being available for consideration. (The European2
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Commission, Green Paper from the Commission on policy
options for progress towards a European Contract Law for
Consumers and Businesses, COM(2010)348final (2010)
received 320 responses until 31 January 2011 with many of
them commenting that it was difficult to comment on
something that is yet unknown). Commentators had to
argue blindly about this proposal while the text was drafted
in secrecy by the expert group and the stakeholder group.
Now that the text and full shape and content of the proposal
are published, the consultation period is closed and
comments no longer officially invited. Commentators can
therefore only file tentative remarks to be considered in the
general legislative process including final drafting.
(i) Critique based on the subsidiarity argument
Looking at the press release and supporting research (eg
“Justice Newsroom: Common European Sales Law to boost
trade and expand consumer choice” http://ec.europa.eu
/justice/newsroom/news/20111011_en.htm [9 April 2012],
p 6).one cannot help noting a certain campaign style, even
slightly pompous language, aiming to fight the cause for the
Common European Sales Law. The large figures for turnover
increases in the internal market and opinion figures in
support of a common contract law are met by yet more
figures gathered by consumer representation groups, such as
Which? and Consumer Focus in the UK. These have been
evaluated in the Reasoned Opinion issued by the UK House
of Commons on 8 December 2011 (see eg points 19 and 20
of the ‘Reasoned Opinion of the House of Commons.
Submitted to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission, pursuant to Article 6 of
Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality.’ accessible as
COD/2011/0284 at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/scrutiny/COD20110284/ukcom.do [3 April 2012]).
Some sections are suggesting opposite findings to those of
the Commission by Which? and Consumer Focus where
traders say they are not deterred from trade within the
European market place by the existence of different laws. In
addition, No 21 of the Opinion confirms research carried out
by Dutch researchers showing that consumer rights are not a
problem but enforcement is (M de Hoon and V Mak,
“Consumer Empowerment Strategies – A Rights-Oriented
Approach Versus a Needs-Oriented Approach”, ZEuP (2011)
518). This point was also maintained in the Reasoned
Opinion filed by the German Bundestag (December 2011).
The Bundestag points to the law and ECJ decision Case
C-436/03 EP v Council [2006] ECR I-3733 regarding the
new co-operative form of company, societas europea (BT-
Drucksache 17/8000, pages 5–6, accessible at
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/080/1708000.pdf
[3 April 2012].):
“In those circumstances, the contested regulation, which leaves
unchanged the different national laws already in existence,
cannot be regarded as aiming to approximate the laws of the
Member States applicable to cooperative societies, but has as
its purpose the creation of a new form of cooperative society in
addition to the national forms” (para 44).
In addition, the Bundestag thinks that not even Article
352 TFEU, which provides a kind of gap-filling enabling
rule, would be the correct legal basis due to a lack of
harmonisation and even uniformisation achieved by the
Regulation (it seems that the wording of Recital 9 of the
Preamble did not convince). The Bundestag was supported
by expert witnesses in its hearing who all agreed that this
reasoning follows from a reverse conclusion drawn from
the scope and purpose of Article 118 TFEU which enables
the Union to create separate – as opposed to
approximating – legal instruments only in the area of
intellectual property rights.
The Bundestag also concludes that as the CESL cannot
achieve what it sets out to do in terms of providing one
comprehensive contract law EU-wide (see preamble recital
27 and see below), it cannot be in accordance with the
principle of proportionality (BT Drucksache 17/8000, p 7).
While it is understandable that the question of legal basis
was debated in such depth given that this is the very
argument the reasoned opinion can be based on, it is
somewhat disappointing to see the whole-hearted rejection
that this new proposal received by the four national
Parliaments that filed reasoned opinions. There are a
number of reasons that lend support to the creation of a
Common European Sales Law. Whether or not this should
be passed in its present form, though, is a different matter.
In the following, I will discuss issues of formal and
substantive nature and suggest ways forward.
(ii) Formal reasons in support of CESL
The European Union legislature is bound to give
quantitative and qualitative reasons in support of any
proposal based on Article 114 TFEU observing the
subsidiarity and proportionality principle in particular.
Formally, this obligation has clearly been discharged by the
conduct of research into the need and acceptance
prospects of an optional common uniform contract law
across Europe. Figures quantify the benefit for the internal
market with reasonable credibility. The fact that figures can
be disputed does not in itself discredit the project, as it is
the nature of such research that it can be disproved. In this
respect the political will underlying such a project can be
sufficiently justified by the data presented.
An element of doubt arises from the fact that 36 per
cent of traders express a difficulty arising from different
contract laws, which means after all that 64 per cent do not
see any problems in this area. Whether such a question
ought to be determined by majority decision or polling,
however, and whether this would count as one, cannot on
the face of it be taken from the relevant EU legislation.
Therefore the data can be said to emit mixed messages, but
should not be necessarily disqualified for this reason. 3
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The proposal has not received the required number of
rejective opinions and has therefore a good chance of being
passed. It might open itself up to subsequent court
proceedings, though, if the well founded arguments
alleging a breach of Article 114 TFEU are ignored.
(iii) Substantive reasons in support of CESL and the
way forward
From a legal viewpoint and in a substantive sense, the
argument in favour of creating any uniform European
contract law – optional, mandatory, comprehensive or
fragmented – lies in the nature of the problem to be solved,
and in the nature of the underlying task at hand.
This task relates to the specific situation which has been
promoted by the European Union ever since its foundation,
that is cross border trade. Cross border trade involves
contracts to be concluded and performed across borders and
these can therefore be called transnational. The expressions
“international contract” and “transnational contract” are
interchangeable according to established use of language, but
in the area of private law and private actors the latter
expression describes the object more appropriately. (For an
extensive discussion of uses of the term “transnational” in
the law, see G-P Calliess, “Transnationales
Verbrauchervertragsrecht”, 68 RablesZ (2004) 244).
Cross border contracts have been predominantly made
by traders, and for this reason a great number of rules of
commercial contract law are in existence already. The 1980
Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) is only one example. This
phenomenon is not limited to the European Union, and
applies globally. The legal problems and limitations
associated with it are also global and not specific to the
European Union, and hence may not as such justify an EU
competence to legislate. The reference of the EU
Commission to the American Uniform Commercial Code
and the Uniform Law Commission in the Green Paper,
Opinion 3 (a) and note 23 therein [which hopefully with
hindsight does not suggest to liken the draft CESL to the
UCC], cannot justify legislative competence of the EU in
the area of contract law generally. As long as the EU is not
a state and legislative competence is derived from the
Treaties, such comprehensive legislation as well as the
establishment of a Law Commission comparable to the US
Uniform Law Commission may exceed this scope. There is
no obstacle, however, to the establishment of a European
Law Commission and the drafting of comprehensive
proposals outside the EU – although this would
presuppose an openness on the part of private
international law doctrine that is currently not there.
The problems arise from private international law so
that much of the tailor-made transnational law does not
find its way into the official jurisprudence and case law
because it cannot be chosen as the “proper law of the
contract”, the lex contractus, the governing law of the
contract to the exclusion of national law. Other problems
resulting from this lack of practice remain in the area of
private international law interpretation techniques. The
new proposal does not solve this problem as will be
explained below, even though it contains some excellent
suggestions how to deal with transnational contract law
(see Recital 29 of the Preamble and Art 4 of Annex I, and
see 3(ii) below.
The reason for the existence of specific commercial
contract law is equally not specific to the European Union
but to the nature of cross border trade generally:
international trade needs to cover specific risks and
difficulties in its contracts which will not arise in the same
way in domestic contracts. Examples are force majeure
clauses and specific inspection and delivery rules.
(Compare for more detail on this subject M Heidemann,
“Does International Trade Need a Doctrine of
Transnational Law? Some Thoughts At the Launch of a
European Contract Law\2 (Springer Briefs in Law,
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York 2012).
At the same time, the national legislator is naturally
confined to its national territorial boundaries so that
legislating for transnational contracts is not possible. This
may be why they disappear easily from the legislature’s
“radar” and conscious awareness.
The aspects which would make this matter a suitable
subject for EU legislation are the following:
• To the extent that the EU is based on and promotes
the internal market, cross border transactions
increase. The national legislature still remains in the
same confined position.
• To the extent that the EU has created the internal
market by removing trade barriers and establishing
EU citizenship cross border transactions have
expanded from trade and commerce into the sphere
of consumers and private transactions. This certainly
ought to be of enough concern to justify EU
legislation in this area. While the concept of “private”
benefit of the achievements of the EU Treaty
freedoms has always been subdued (eg by the sparse
instances of procedural rights for the individual and
the initial confinement of free movement of persons
to work related migration) and channelled indirectly
through the concept of market benefit and the benefit
of the internal market as such, the Union has
nevertheless created a vast amount of law directed at
consumers.
This could be read as both an argument against and in
favour of the new contract law proposal. While the
consumer may have been seen solely as a commercial factor
within the internal market by the EU organs (due to the
need to observe the scope of the Treaties) so far any
uniform EU-wide contract law has a more free standing
nature and is not closely bound to commercial
developments as it will have to be based on the general
understanding of contract law by the citizens using this law.4
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So, while the EU legislature is bound by the scope of the EU
Treaties, the general contract law goes further than that.
This inherent conflict needs to be eliminated in order to
create a successful proposal in this area. If this is not
possible, CESL may be a more suitable project for an
international Convention which can be signed and ratified
by all MS regardless of Treaty powers. (This suggestion was
already made at the outset of the current legislative
proposal, cf M W Hesselijnk, “The European Commission’s
Action Plan: towards a more coherent European Contract
Law?”, European Review of Private Law (2004) 397, 412;
and W van Gerven, “Coherence of Community and national
laws; is there a legal basis for a European Civil Code?”,
ERPL (1997) 465).
It has to be recognised that uniformisation of law within
the EU is not an accepted end in itself under the current
Treaties as the above-mentioned legal opinions correctly
express. However, the fact that as a result of the creation of
the internal market consumers increasingly face similar
problems to international traders arising from the fact that
contracts may be transnational in nature feeds into the plan
at the start of the Common European Sales Law project:
the consolidation of the EU consumer acquis.
It is clear that the current proposal focuses mainly on
consumer contracts despite the inclusion of contracts
between traders. It is also clear that despite being called a
sales law the proposal includes issues of general contract
law and therefore exceeds its published scope. It is further
clear that the current proposal envisages mainly problems
of internet sales (“e-commerce”) and distance (“off-
premises”) sales. It is therefore not far-fetched to propose
that the optional Common European Sales Law should be a
mandatory Common European Consumer Law. Limiting the
scope of such law to transnational contracts would have
been a natural addition not only to the existing consumer
law already implemented but also to existing commercial
contract law which does not necessarily need to be included
into such a proposal. (see Heidemann (2012) and see also
Hans-W Micklitz and N Reich, The Commission Proposal for a
“Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)” – Too
Broad or Not Broad Enough?, EUI Working Paper LAW
2012/04 (commissioned by the Austrian Ministry of
Consumer Affairs); available at http://cadmus.
eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/20485/LAW_2012_04_Mic
klitz_Reich.pdf?sequence=3 [10 April 2012]; and further
The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, An
Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems.
Advice to the UK Government (The Law Commission, Scottish
Law Commission, 2011), p 39).
The defining characteristics of transnational consumer
law are the typical factual problems arising out of the cross
border situation such as bridging geographical distance,
language, different legal understanding and background,
but also importantly out of modern technological advance
and business organisation which leaves the consumer to
handle technology in order to purchase, pay and deliver or
receive goods as well as having to deal with a potentially
overbearing anonymous contract partner (see below 4(i)).
These typically lead to the difficulties described by
consumer groups and the above – mentioned Dutch study.
For these problems solutions can well be made at EU
level because it is the supranational legislator of choice from
where previous law has emanated and which – other than
commercial contract law – is not present to the same extent
in the wider world beyond the EU (the “natural legislator”
– see J Dalhuisen, “The Modern Lex Mercatoria and its
Dynamism”, Blog on Opinio Iuris, 3 April 2012,
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/03/the-modern-lex-
mercatoria-and-its-dynamism/ [9 April 2012]).
The instrument of a regulation is also the instrument of
choice given that the transnational nature of the
transactions prevents the national legislators from
legislating effectively in this area (see Explanatory
Memorandum, p 10, (s 3) confirming conformity with the
principle of proportionality).
Leaving such an instrument optional, however, is not
promising as the protective nature of the contract rules
therein may not appeal to the traders who, under the
current proposal, and according to correct observations of
consumer groups as conveyed by parliaments, will be the
ones to offer those terms and not the consumer; cf
Reasoned Opinion of the UK House of Commons 2011,
No 31, and see also recital 22 of the Preamble.
3. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
The proposal aims to avoid problems of private
international law and any changes in the existing catalogue
of conflict rules. Earlier considerations to change the
wording of Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation published in
the Green Paper (see above 2, Option 4) have not
manifested in this draft proposal.
(i) National or transnational law?
The current proposal emphasises that the CESL is to be
regarded as national law, a separate regime alongside
domestic contract law. These intentions are set out in the
Explanatory Memorandum and in the Preamble
(Explanatory Memorandum p 6, Preamble, recital 9), but
they are not reflected in the Regulation or the Sales Law
itself. It is therefore questionable if this result is supported
by the existing law.
Recital 10 suggests a choice of law procedure that may
sound simple but is far more complex upon a closer look.
It obviously seeks to preserve the choices made by the
Rome I Regulation (Reg (EC) 593/2008) and allow only
the choice of the law of a state, not transnational law,
regardless of whether this is formal or non-state law. It
therefore presupposes a choice of law which then
determines the CESL to apply to a contract as part of such
domestic contract law. One would then technically not 5
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choose CESL as the governing law but “MS law CESL” or
“the law of the state of x and its CESL” or “the CESL of
state x”. Parties to a contract should be made aware of this,
and of the fact that there are still many issues remaining
which may have to be resolved according to national laws,
and that the choice of this national law should be made by
them or be subject to the Rome I Regulation (Preamble,
recital 27 and see below). It is my submission therefore
that Recital 10 of the Preamble simply does not work and
makes no sense.
The second aspect that makes the CESL a peculiar item
in terms of private international law is that it is of course a
transnational law in that it wants to provide a uniform
source of law applicable to cross border contracts. This
source of law has emanated from the EU legislator and not
from the national Parliaments as is the case with national
law. It is therefore debatable whether CESL and the
Regulation can be regarded as national law even though the
Regulation is of course directly applicable (in support of
this view see the Austrian Reasoned Opinion issued by the
Federal Council, accessible at http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/scrutiny/COD20110284/atbun.do [28 April 2012]).
The German doctrine surrounding CISG shows how
difficult the answer to the question is. CISG, even though
implemented into German law by way of the EGBG the PIL
act, is meant to remain subject to mandatory rules of
German law and hence seems to be referred to as a legal
order outside the domestic. Leible called the legal nature of
EU rules “ambivalent” in his talk at the EP hearing on 1
March 2012 but dismissed the argument of the Austrian
Federal Council that the choice of law stipulation might not
have the desired effect; cf Stefan Leible “ The proposal for
a Common European Sales Law – how should it function




The EU legislator seems to have a similar perception of
CESL when it is suggested that CESL may be chosen to
govern the contracts even between parties resident in an
EU Member State and parties from third countries
(Preamble, recital 14). CESL thereby displays a certain
oscillating legal nature.
Article 11 of the Regulation requires the “exclusive
application in relation to national law.” Recital 27 of the
Preamble sets out where the limits of CESL are and these
items form the interface with national law and the application
process then reverts back to the standard mechanism of
establishing a national law to govern the contract and taking
solutions from there. This leads to the next point, the
interpretation rules for CESL (see 3(ii) below).
The peculiarity of this model becomes even clearer when
looking at recital 14 of the Preamble where the mechanism
for the choice of CESL in contracts between an EU trader
and a consumer from a third party state is sketched: the
choice of CESL is meant to be the choice of a foreign law
for that “third party consumer” and subject to general
choice of law rules. Hence the problem of choosing this
foreign law is subject to exactly the same problems as it has
always been, namely that the foreign law is largely unknown
to the “third party” consumer, that his or her home state
mandatory consumer law will prevail over CESL, that he or
she cannot really influence this choice, and so forth. A
foreign law can also not be chosen in parts so that it
becomes clear that CESL is lacking an important quality
when made to have an existence exclusively as an integral
part of national contract laws and confined to the EU area.
Transnational trade needs a more universal approach
which cannot be taken by the EU legislature because of the
restrictions of the EU Treaties (cf 2(iii) above).
(ii) Interpretation technique
Recital 29 of the Preamble supported by Article 4 of
Annex I (CESL) describes the interpretation technique for
CESL. This is a summary of the most important points to
note about interpretation of any international and
transnational law, the so-called autonomous interpretation
method. The EU legislator cannot be applauded enough
for including this section into the proposal. This technique
is a vital ingredient in the creation of a doctrine of
transnational law. This recital alone would merit a
regulation. Without it no tailor-made transnational law can
be applied effectively and fulfill its objective, which is
providing suitable law for cross border transactions. Recital
29 is of paramount importance, especially in connection
with the above-mentioned recital 27 which enumerates
those questions of law that are excluded from CESL.
Experience shows that users of transnational law are all too
tempted on reaching the interface with national law to
understand the clauses to be a conflict rule and happily
revert back to their own domestic law, as this is what they
understand. What is needed, though, to develop a full
regime of transnational contract law is an understanding of
the transnational or cross border nature of the transaction
in dispute. Article 7 CISG and many other international
conventions contain the respective clause:
[Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
1980]
Article 7
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be
had to its international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith
in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or,
in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
To match the provisions made in recital 29, Article11 of
the Regulation provides for the exclusive application of6
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CESL to the exclusion of national contract laws. Recital 29
ought to be included in Article 11 of the Regulation.
Article 8(3) of the Regulation provides that CESL cannot
be chosen in parts but only as a whole.These principles
ought to apply to any set of transnational contract laws.
Another obvious aspect of interpretation technique is of
course jurisprudence and case law. Article 14 of the
Regulation prescribes the creation of a data base and
reporting duties for the Member States regarding “final
judgments.” However, there is no explanation of the
reasons and purpose for this. The model for this database
is obviously CISG and the informal database at Pace Law
School Institute of International Commercial Law and at
the Unidroit Institute in Rome (UNILEX), where users
are invited to form a “jurisconsultorium”in order to form
a standard of interpreting CISG or the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts
respectively (see C Baasch Andersen, The Uniformity of the
CISG and its Jurisconsultorium, (Kluwer Law International,
Alphen aan den Rijn 2007). A doctrine of binding
international precedent does not exist to this day, however.
It is therefore questionable what the purpose and legal
basis for the installation of such a database is. The closest
one can get to international precedent is the doctrine of
Entscheidungsharmonie, which postulates reference to other
decisions in courts of different countries about a particular
question of international law so that a certain harmonious
accord can be achieved even in the absence of a dedicated
higher authority for a particular question of law.
In the case of EU law, however, this authority will be the
courts of the EU. These in turn may face such an excessive
workload when consulted about questions of contract law
under CESL that it is highly doubtful if justice could be
delivered in this way. The courts have also so far essentially
adjudicated about the scope of the Treaties. Regarding
CESL, they may for the first time be confronted with
contract law cases and required to judge about private law
directly within the existing structure of limited procedure,
ie preliminary rulings and complaints about breach of EU
law by public bodies and individuals in certain limited cases
under the revised procedures. It is not at all straightforward
to assume that this provides a sufficient infrastructure to
manage contract law on this EU-wide scale. No explicit
plans to use the possibility to install a specialised branch of
the courts exist to date.
(iii) Relation to CISG
Recital 25 of the Preamble states that a choice of CESL
excludes the application of CISG. The planned database
experience with the respective databases established for the
use of CISG and the use of UNIDROIT Principles is therefore
also dismissed, despite drawing on this model with the
suggestion. It is unclear what purpose is pursued by this
policy. One purpose may be the reinforcement of the intended
scope of CESL: it can be chosen in business to consumer (
b2c) contracts but also for contracts between traders if one
trader is a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME – see Art
7 of the Regulation). States can provide for CESL to be agreed
to be the governing law for contracts between large traders.
CISG is of course the legal regime of choice for commercial
contracts, and equally part of domestic law in those countries
who have ratified the Convention. It was probably envisaged
that clashes would arise from encountering parallel regimes
in this way upon a choice of CESL.
The author does not share this concern. CISG and CESL
would only overlap in scope in some instances where CESL
is eligible as the governing law. A priority clause would
clarify the order of application between the two regimes,
but may not even be necessary as “domestic law” is already
taking second place after CESL when it is selected. CISG
as part of domestic law – where this conception is adopted
– will share this role. This way, the databases and potential
analogies could still be utilised without creating an
additional doctrinal obstacle. The exclusion clause is
therefore unnecessary.
The Explanatory Memorandum refers on page 5 (s 1) to
CISG and emphasises that “there is no mechanism which
could ensure its uniform interpretation.” While this is
technically true, many years of experience with CISG have
established an international body of case law that may not
have official endorsement but seems to yield certain results
which have made its way into the CESL. Article 121 for
instance seems to incorporate (German) case law on
Article 38 and 39 CISG and provide some sort of
restatement of findings made in this area (for instance the
interpretation of the expression “reasonable time” as
meaning 14 days by default, see below 4(ii). Courts have
predominantly found the notice period “too long” or
“reasonable” rather than settling on a fixed time span.
Another question is whether it is suitable to replace
CISG by CESL and insist on the inclusion of commercial
contracts, ie business to business (b2b) contracts into
CESL. I have commented in depth on this elsewhere (cf
Heidemann (2012)).
In my view it would be preferable to take the scope of CISG
as a starting point and create CESL as complementary law to
CISG governing consumer sales contracts providing the
complementary scope provision based on Article 1 and 2 CISG:
[Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
1980]
Article 1
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or
commercial character of the parties or of the contract is to be
taken into consideration in determining the application of this
Convention.
Article 2
This Convention does not apply to sales:
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use,
unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the
contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the
goods were bought for any such use;... 7
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The problems of gaps as mentioned in the Explanatory
Memorandum can only be resolved by recourse to either other
suitable rules of transnational law or domestic law by way of an
evolving and improved doctrine of private international law (see
for a clear description of the method of handling international
law sources J Dalhuisen, “The Operation of the Modern Lex
Mercatoria: The Hierarchy of Norms,” guest blog on Opinio
Iuris, 3 April 2012, http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/03/the-
operation-of-the-modern-lex-mercatoria-the-hierarchy-of-
norms/ [8 April 2012].
4. SUBSTANTIVE LAW – REGULATION,
ANNEX 1
In this section I comment on a selection of Articles
which display weaknesses or possibly even errors, and also
suggest how to offer an improved solution.
(i) Regulation
Article 4
Article 4 is one of the scope provisions and establishes
when a contract is a cross-border contract and eligible to
be governed by CESL. It stipulates that certain criteria
need to be allocated to different countries and at least one
those an EU MS.
These criteria are different depending on whether the
party is a trader or a consumer. For traders it is required
that they have their “habitual residence” in different
countries (Art 4 (2)). For consumers, however, it is
sufficient that their address is in a country other than that
of the habitual residence of the trader (“address” meaning
billing address, delivery address or just “the address
indicated by the consumer”, Art 4(3)(a)). This is striking.
First of all, the criterion of habitual residence is not
without its difficulties. In the case of a “trader,” problems
of localisation caused by business organisation will arise. .
Consequently, Article 4(4) and (5) explain the “habitual
residence” of the trader in more detail and qualify this
criterion in a much more meaningful way (ie introducing
the central administration, principal place of business,
branch, agency, “any establishment”. Compare also in
connection with this problem The Law Commission and
Scottish Law Commission, An Optional Common European
Sales Law: Advantages and Problems. Advice to the UK Government
(The Law Commission, Scottish Law Commission, 2011),
pp 13–19 and 35–39).
Those additional criteria are more tangible and easier to
understand by the average consumer. They ought therefore to
be the ones to be used to give the consumer guidelines how he
or she can recognise and double check whether his or her
contract qualifies for the application of CESL. The criterion of
habitual residence – apart from being ideally related to natural
persons – is of course modelled on the Rome I Regulation,
but is by no means helpful or necessary in this context. Article
4 (4) and (5) could be easily put into the place of Article4(2).
Regarding the address of the consumer, this obviously
puts the trader in an awkward position. Addresses are easily
given and if this is a criterion that allows the application of
CESL even in cases where the address might turn out to be
wrong and the habitual residence of the consumer contract
partner later turns out to be in the same MS as the trader’s
branch. Only then can the trader truly rely on this
provision, which leaves a lot of uncertainty as to the valid
choice of CESL for both parties, but most of all for the
trader.
Again, Articles 1 and 2 CISG, the scope provisions of
CISG, provide an excellent model for the solution of this
problem, including potential errors about the parties’
localisation. “Place of business” is an expression which
summarises branches, agencies and central administrations
more clearly to a legally untrained consumer than the
expression “habitual residence” which is obviously
intended to maintain coherence with the Rome I
Regulation for better or worse.
Articles 5, 6, 7, 10 and 13
Articles 5 describes the type of contract CESL can be used
for, ie sales contracts (a) and related service contracts (c).
Contracts for the supply of digital content (b) are also
expressly mentioned. Article 6 then expressly excludes certain
contract types but other scope articles use positive language
describing the scope of application and eligible parties.
Again, taking recourse to Articles 1 and 2 CISG could be
worthwhile here. CISG provides a very elegant way of
creating a scope which can be integrated into the existing
dichotomy of merchant and non-merchant contracts (Art
1 (3) CISG) as it is still maintained in most European civil
laws.
[Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
1980]
Article 1
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State.
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in
different States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not
appear either from the contract or from any dealings between,
or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract.
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or
commercial character of the parties or of the contract is to be
taken into consideration in determining the application of this
Convention.
Article 2
This Convention does not apply to sales:
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use,
unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the
contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the
goods were bought for any such use; ...8
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CISG describes consumer contracts in Article 2 (a). It
picks up on the so-called objective approach to
denominating commercial, or in this case, private
contracts. It is to be considered whether this is not a more
suitable approach rather than embarking on a
characterisation of the parties to the contract as consumers
or traders. The “personal scope” of the proposal seems to
serve as an important factor in meeting the legitimisation
criteria under the EU Treaties (see Explanatory
Memorandum, p 10 (s 3.)) A description of the purpose of
the contract as in Article 2 CISG instead catches the most
characteristic difference between a private and a
commercial contract. It is the use that the parties want to
make of the purchased goods or digital content. This
intention and attitude towards the object of the contract
distinguishes the trader from the consumer. The consumer
wants to keep and use the goods whereas the trader wants
to pass them on, he or she receives them with the sole
purpose of reselling. This is the reason why contract law
needs to reconcile the interests of these two parties, rather
than a difference in personal characteristics in the
consumer or trader.
A focus on the contract and its purpose may allow a
more neutral attitude of the legislator and the provision of
more appropriate solutions. As explained in 2(iii) above,
the problem to be solved may not have been sufficiently
defined and analysed prior to the creation of this tailor
made law.
If it is predominantly the consumer who is at the heart
of this measure then surely contracts among consumers
(consumer to consumer – c2c), ought to have been
considered here, too. Ebay for instance provides a platform
that could be used by consumers across Europe if the
question of the applicable law was easier to establish. Ebay,
like a giant car boot sale, is a reality for consumers all over
Europe who are currently making use of modern
technologies available to them, but are usually still confined
to their own country.
The characteristics of modern cross border trade are
determined by the presence of electronic means of
communication and payment and e-commerce, as well as
by the highly professionalised production methods and
business organisation leading to mass retail and with it a
highly anonymous appearance of the trader in the face of
the consumer. These issues require both a suitable legal
basis for substantive contract law and choice of law as well
as a suitable infrastructure to assist the consumer in order
to match the organisation levels of the businesses he or she
is dealing with. The subject matter was at the heart of the
academic debate about unfair contract terms legislation
when that began (see the essay by Professor Hans Merz
,”Massenvertrag und allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen” in
Law Faculty of the University of Fribourg (ed), Festgabe für
Wilhelm Schönenberger: zum 70. Geburtstag am 21, September
1968 (Universitätsverlag, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1968)).
A modern instrument for European cross border trade
should meet the whole range of facilities available to the
consumer in the wake of the removal of trade barriers in
the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers under the four
freedoms of the EU internal market. This ranges from
one-off transactions between private parties to mass retail
conducted by international concerns. It is therefore
advisable to concentrate on the provision of consumer sales
law to counteract distortions in the balance within the
contractual relationship between consumers and
businesses which are doubtlessly present and have been
identified by research over the past decades.
Returning to the original project of consolidating the
consumer acquis and providing both contract law and
accompanying infrastructure to support consumer sales
would therefore be a natural way forward. The provision of
the forms in Annex I and II of the proposed instrument are
an important step into this direction.
The purpose of Articles 7 and 13 CESL is not
immediately clear. Traders are supposed to be able to elect
CESL to govern their contract even if no consumer is
involved, but only if one of them is an “SME” unless states
have extended the scope according to Article 13. The
question is why would they want to do so? It is a known
factor and experience that small businesses have certain
disadvantages in relation to large businesses. This can
include the inability to influence the terms of business due
to weak negotiating power as well as a lack of available
resources in order to establish the details of a foreign law
if forced to accept a respective choice of law clause. It is
not clear, though in which way traders will have an
advantage from the choice of CESL. Unfair contract terms
legislation will be available to them under domestic
European laws. The specific advantages consumers have
under CESL are not available to them as traders. The
specific b2b clauses of CESL are identical in CISG and the
UNIDROIT Principles supported by case law. There is
therefore no obvious reason why CESL would be an
advantage over the choice of domestic law including CISG
or indeed any other tailor made transnational commercial
contract law.
The definition of SMEs displays another difficulty
introduced by the creators of CESL. This definition is based
upon Commission Recommendation 2003/361 from 2003
and identical to those used in national taxation laws to
establish the thresholds for the application of stages of
corporation tax or reporting duties. It is regrettable to see
an intrusion of the spirit of regulatory and public law into a
genuinely private law sector. It puts another question mark
behind the EU as the “natural legislator” for this project.
The same goes for Article 10, which requires the MS to
establish “penalties” for the breach of information and
other duties under CESL, a genuinely alien remedy in
contract law. (breaches of Arts 8 and 9 of the Regulation,
complete with standard wording for the penalty to be 9
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“effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” Contract law is
essentially concerned with the enforceability of claims
rather than with behavioural rules as such. For this reason
sanctions for the breach of such rules are not needed, the
breach will be sanctioned via the lack of enforceability.
(Apparently this is not clear any more in modern law
reform, as the new German concept of “breach of duty” in
the BGB of 2001 shows: cf M Heidemann, “International
Commercial Harmonisation and National Resistance –
The Development and Reform of Transnational
Commercial Law and its Application within National Legal
Culture” in M Andenas and C Baasch Andersen (eds),
Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2011)).
Remedies like fixed penalties (independent of liquidated
damages), strict liability and last but not least the astreinte,
have therefore found their way into international contract
law only after fierce discussion, and some are still meeting
firm resistance from those users whose countries do not
traditionally recognise them.
The legislature does not explain what legal nature such
penalties under Article 10 ought to have, and which
elements of breach they are supposed to sanction.
Resulting differences in the national laws will add to the list
of excluded matters listed in recital 27 of the Preamble.
(ii) Annex 1 (the Sales Law)
In this section a small selection of individual rules is
highlighted in chronological order to show weaknesses in
the drafting which could be easily rectified.
It is not clear what aims are pursued through the choice
of language and style. While cross referencing is usually
clear and straightforward, as is the revised method of
counting the Articles (compared to previous drafts such as
the CFR and PECL), the language is apparently sometimes
oversimplified, as it is sometimes inconsistent or incorrect.
It is not clear if it is supposed to be simple at the expense
of correctness and technical coherence in accordance with
existing law.
Articles 119–122
One cannot help thinking that these articles dealing with
inspection duties among traders have not only been drafted
after the model of CISG and UNIDROIT Principles but
that some of the case law on those rules has been included
into these articles in the manner of a restatement. The
stipulation of a “reasonable time” for inspection in CISG
has now been specified to be two weeks. Article 119
maintains the “reasonable time” requirement.
It is not clear why it was thought that drawing on the
experience with domestic jurisprudence and doctrine
involving CISG is alright, but otherwise CISG needs to be
excluded from use alongside CESL. Any further evolution
of those provisions, which have obviously been taken from
these earlier sets of rules, is thereby prevented for CESL
and an entirely fresh start will have to be made. Ignoring
previous work on uniform law is therefore unhelpful.
Article 129
“(a) doing all the acts...”: is this a necessary choice of
words?
Article 131
Paragraph (4) is unclear. It is one example where an
effort was made to draft in clear simple terms for easy
understanding by the user. The last paragraph however will
not be easy to apply by a legally untrained user. Double
negation is not the terminology of choice.
Article 132
Is it necessary to use the expression “recover” when it
concerns the first instance of being entitled to the price? In
Articles 120(2) and (3) where the word recover is appropriate,
it denotes a loss or overpayment to be “recovered.”’
5. SUBSTANTIVE LAW – ANNEX II
Annex II consists of the Standard Information Notice.
Two points are of concern.
(i) Validity of choice of law agreement
The third paragraph (p114, para 3) stipulates that “the
contract will only be valid after you have received this
notice and confirmed your consent.” It is not clear that
this wording only relates to the agreement to make CESL
the applicable law. It seems to refer to the sales contract as
such. If this wording is not changed it will have the effect
that the sales contract is only valid after the consumer has
received notice of CESL inclusion.
Apparently it is intended that this notice necessarily
needs to be a hard copy which will delay contracts made by
electronic means. Is this the intended legal consequence?
If so, is it necessary? It will cause delays in the cases
mentioned therein (contracts made via SMS or telephone).
This is a departure from general contract law where the
applicable law does not affect the validity of a contract.
Alternatively, if this is a misleading wording or clerical
error then it must be redrafted. Care should be taken that
consumer contract law does not drift off into the area of
guardianship.
(ii) Damages provision for breach of information
notice
“Your rights before signing the contract”: last sentence,
“you are entitled to damages.” Is this correct? Does one
not have to prove a loss or harm? Is this meant to be strict
liability or a fixed penalty? Is this referring to Article 10
CESL?
I do not believe the current wording is appropriate, it is
misleading and ought to be revised.10
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6 CONCLUSION
The proposal on the optional Common European Sales
Law offers excellent new instruments to support cross
border trade. The inclusion of forms to help the trader and
the consumer to observe basic requirements of current EU
consumer and private international law are progressive and
useful. In order to observe the limits of EU competences,
the proposal ought to be limited to consumer contracts. It
should equally include consumer to consumer contracts. In
addition to providing contract law rules it should extend
and improve a complementary infrastructure for
consumers to match existing high levels of business
organisation on the part of businesses currently trading
across borders in the form of procedural rules and
consumer agencies, representations and organisations. This
cross border consumer contract law should be mandatory
not optional.
The scope of the CESL could be successfully drafted
after the model of CISG, providing a complementary
instrument to this existing body of transnational
commercial contract law. The transnational legal nature of
CESL must be recognised and supported by choice of law
rules and a firm recourse to the autonomous interpretation
technique in recital 29 of the Preamble and Article 4 CESL
(Annex I). Additional research work should be done to
define the requirements of international consumer
contracts and establish the needs to be included into CESL
based on the purpose and requirements of the contracts
rather than the parties, following the traditional objective
approach to existing law merchant. This will also be in the
interest of preserving the integrity of existing national
private law and thereby satisfy requirements under the EU
Treaties.
Private autonomy should be strictly observed as the basis
for legislation. Recourse to public policy instruments such
as penalties for behavioural rules modelled after breaches
of Treaty law and providing stifling definitions of
contractual parties such as SMEs should be avoided. This is
in the interest of preserving contract law as a domaine of
private law.
Finally, adjudication of case law arising out of CESL
must receive special attention and be accompanied by
guarantees of an appropriate jurisdictional infrastructure
and procedural rules. Arguments challenging the
competence of the EU under Article 114 TFEU in this
area should be taken seriously, especially in view of the
flawed consultation process.
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